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Chichester v. Taylor
No. 98-15, 1999 WL 3736 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1999)
L Facts
On August 16, 1991, two black men, wearing dark clothes, masks, and
gloves and both wielding pistols, entered a pizza restaurant located in
Manassas, Virginia. One of the men was approximately three inches taller
than the other. The shorter of the two men jumped over the counter, took
money from the register, and ordered the restaurant manager to open a
second register. The taller of the two men stayed on the customer side of
the counter. The manager was unable to open the register. One of the men
shot and killed the manager.'
Because both men were masked, none of the four eyewitnesses to the
murder were able to identify either of the men. However, another witness
in the vicinity at the time, Jack Burdette ("Burdette"), told police that he saw
two men running from the direction of the restaurant and identified one of
the men as Carl Chichester ("Chichester"). Of the three eyewitnesses who
testified at trial, Denise Matney ("Matney"), said that the man on the cus-
tomer side of the counter, purportedly Chichester, was the triggerman in the
murder, but she originally told police she was unsure who actually shot the
store manager. Another of the eyewitnesses, Patricia Eckert, originally told
police that the man on the employee side of the counter, Chichester's accom-
plice, was the triggerman, but at trial she testified that she was unsure of who
pulled the trigger. A fourth eyewitness, sixteen-year old William Fruit
("Fruit"), was unavailable to testify at trial, but originally told police that he
thought the man on the employee side of the counter was the shooter.
2
To establish an alibi, the defense introduced evidence that Chichester
was in Washington, D.C., at his job with his family's janitorial business on
the evening of the murder. Chichester's mother testified that Chichester
was penciled in to work on the evening of the murder, but she and
Chichester's sister, also scheduled to work the night of the murder, testified
that they had no recollection of whether Chichester actually worked or not
on the night of the murder.'
1. Chichester v. Taylor, No. 98-15, 1999 WL 3736, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1999). The
Commonwealth of Virginia executed thirty-six year old Carl Hamilton Chichester on April
13, 1999. Peter Bacque, Chichester is Executed; Fifth this Year, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
April 14, 1999, at B1.
2. Chichester, 1999 WL 3736, at *1.
3. Id., at *2.
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Chichester was found guilty of capital murder, robbery, and firearms
charges in September 1993. The jury recommended the death sentence after
finding the future dangerousness aggravating factor. In December, the trial
judge adopted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Chichester to death.
Chichester's subsequent appeals to the courts of Virginia and the Supreme
Court of the United States were all denied. On June 19, 1997, Chichester
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court dismissed the peti-
tion. From that order of dismissal, Chichester appealed.4
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, made the follow-
ing rulings: (1) Chichester's counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for
failing to investigate and present evidence that Chichester was not the trigger-
man, to explore testimony regarding the gun used in the murder, and to im-
p each certain witnesses; (2) the district court's denial of Chichester's motion
or an expert to assist in developing evidence of prejudice resulting from his
trial counsel's actions was not improper because Chichester had failed to
show that any of his trial counsel's actions were unreasonable, thus there was
no need to examine any resulting prejudice; (3) Fruit's pretrial statement that
the man on the employee side of the counter was the triggerman was not new
evidence as defined in Schlup v. Delo,5 and therefore Chichester did not
establish a probability of innocence as contemplated in Scblup; and (4) the
admission of evidence of a prior robbery at a pizza restaurant in a nearby
town, of which Chichester was convicted, did not violate the Virginia rule
barring the admission of prior crimes to show a propensity to commit the
crime charged where the robbery was committed in a very similar manner.6
II. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Investigation of Triggerman Evidence
Chichester claimed that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
for failing to investigate and present evidence suggesting that Chichester was
4. Id., at *2 (citing Chichester v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638 (Va. 1994);
Chichester v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995)).
5. 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (holding that new reliable evidence, showing that a constitu-
tional violation probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, can
establish actual innocence of the underlying offense). Seealso Barbara Anna Pohl, Case Note,
CAP. DEF. J., Spring 1995, at 4 (analyzing Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995)).
6. Chicbester, 1999 WL 3736, at *2-8. Chichester's claims relating to failure of trial
counsel to impeach Burdette, the sufficiency of Fruit's statement to satisfy the Schlup
standard, and the introduction of evidence of the prior robbery will not be discussed at length
in this summary. The court's rulings on these issues appear correct, are briefly stated, and
provided little useful insight for defense counsel.
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not the triggerman in the shooting. The court applied the two-prong test of
Strickland v. Washington7 to counsel's failure to both investigate and present
triggerman evidence. In each instance, the court found that trial counsel's
failures did not satisfy the objective unreasonableness prong of Strickland.!
The court ruled that trial counsel's failure to investigate triggerman
evidence was not unreasonable based on language in Strickland and its
interpretation by the Fourth Circuit in Barnes v. Thompson.9 In Barnes, the
Fourth Circuit held that trial counsel may rely on the truthfulness of his
client and those whom he interviews in deciding how to pursue his investi-
gation.1" Since Chichester told trial counsel that he was elsewhere on the
night of the murder," the court ruled that Chichester's trial counsel could
rely on that statement in determining what lines of defense to pursue. Since
investigation of any triggerman evidence conflicted with an alibi defense, the
court ruled that it was reasonable for trial counsel not to investigate trigger-
man evidence. 2
The court's ruling on the failure to investigate triggerman evidence may
be correct under applicable case law. However, the fact that the failure to
investigate triggerman evidence was not unreasonable as a matter of law does
not mean that the failure to investigate triggerman evidence was necessarily
the best approach. Trial counsel had evidence suggesting doubt that
Chichester was the triggerman. This evidence included the statements from
Fruit, Eckert and Matey, all of whom told the police or testified at some
point to the following: (1) that they were unsure who the triggerman was
or (2) that the man on the employee side of the counter was the shooter. In
Virginia, the status of not being the triggerman in a capital murder case
means the difference between life and death. Under section 18.2-18 of the
Virginia Code, in a murder perpetrated by two or more defendants, only the
person who inflicted the lethal blow, the "triggerman," may be convicted of
capital murder."
Under Strickland, the court excused counsel's failure to pursue the
triggerman defense as a tactical decision based on a conflict with defendant's
7. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding counsel's performance to be constitutionally ineffec-
tive if (1) counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and (2) counsel's deficient
performance was prejudicial to the defendant).
8. The court ruled that the failure to present triggerman evidence at trial was not
constitutionally ineffective because Chichester's counsel presented an alibi defense. Had
counsel presented evidence that Chichester was not the triggerman, counsel would had to
have conceded that Chichester may have been at the scene of the crime, a concession inconsis-
tent with an alibi defense. For this reason, the court ruled that trial counsel's choice not to
present triggerman evidence was not unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Chichester, 1999 WL 3736, at *3.
9. 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1995).
10. Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 979-80 (4th Cir. 1995).
11. Chichester, 1999 WL 3736, at *4.
12. Id.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (Michie 1998).
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alibi defense. Strickland held that the reasonableness of the failure to investi-
gate is to be evaluated according to the reason for the decision not to investi-
gate.14 The Strickland rationale permits information supplied by the client
to virtually control that evaluation."
As a practical matter, however, Strickland is not a guide to the tactical
choices required in a capital case. This case is illustrative of that point. As
a general proposition, complete reliance on the client is ill-advised. For
example, consider the number of times defendants change their stories when
confronted with evidence by their police interrogators. In this case, was the
tactical decision to go with an alibi rather than a triggerman defense made
before or after the weakness of the alibi testimony from Chichester's
mother and sister became apparent? 6 It is the practical, if not constitu-
tional, duty of capital defense counsel to investigate every potentially signifi-
cant defense matter regardless of the wishes or assertions of the client.
2. Shape of Gun and Ballistics Testimony
Chichester made two more ineffective assistance of counsel claims, one
of which centered around testimony made by Julian Mason ("Mason"),
the Commonwealth's ballistics expert, and Matney. Matney testified that
the man on the customer side of the counter, purportedly Chichester, was
carrying a box-like gun.17 On appeal, Chichester argued that it was ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel not to exploit this testimony because this descrip-
tion would not have fit the gun used in the murder 8 but would have fit the
gun used in the prior pizza restaurant robbery 9 of which Chichester had
been convicted. To refute Matney's testimony, Mason testified for the
Commonwealth that the two types of guns are very similar in appearance
and that a description of box-like could fit the handgun used in the crime.20
The court denied this claim because no evidence contradicting Mason
existed, and therefore, the decision of counsel was reasonable.2' Unfortu-
nately, the court failed to acknowledge that the reason there was no evi-
dence contrary to Mason's testimony, the absence of which made counsel's
actions reasonable, was because trial counsel failed to seek or present such
14. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
15. Id.
16. Neither Chichester's mother nor his sister could specifically remember if
Chichester was actually at-work on the night of the murder. See infa note 3 and accompany-
ing text.
17. Id., at *5.
18. Id. The gun used in the murder was a .380 caliber handgun. Id.
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evidence. Thus, the court creates an interesting position whereby the failure
of trial counsel to refute Mason's testimony meant there was no evidence
from which the court could find trial counsel's actions unreasonable.2
3. Denial of an Expert Witness to Help Prove the
Prejudice Prong of Strickland
In relation to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Chichester
claimed that the district court incorrectly denied his request for an appoint-
ment of an expert to assist in developing his claim of prejudice resulting
from trial counsel's actions. The court ruled that since trial counsel's
actions were not unreasonable (the first prong of the Strickland test), there
was no need for the court to appoint an expert to help Chichester develop
prejudice (the second prong of the Strickland test).23 In its most technical
sense, this ruling seems fairly convincing.
However, had an expert been appointed, this expert would likely have
helped prepare evidence on both the prejudice prong of the test and the
reasonableness prong. For an expert to assist in showing prejudice, he
would first have to know specifically if and how trial counsel's actions had
been unreasonable, otherwise he would be unable to testify on how a
specific action prejudiced a defendant. Perhaps the error here was in appel-
late counsel's request for an expert to assist only with the prejudice prong
of his claim. Had counsel requested an expert to assist in the development
of both prejudice and unreasonableness, the court may have been more
willing to grant the expert.
B. Ake Motions: How They Could Have Been Used in this Case
In Virginia, expert assistance can be obtained through several proce-
dures, one of which is a motion based on Ake v. Oklahoma,24 Caldwell v.
Mississippi," and Husske v. Commonwealth. 6 In Ake, the United States
Supreme Court held that if sanity is to be an issue at trial, a defendant has
22. The court employed the same circular rationale to excuse defense counsel's failure
to seek and present expert testimony to repute the testimony of Mason and Dr. Frances Field,
another Commonwealth expert. They testified that absence of gunshot residue on the victim
meant that any gunshots had to have been fired from more than two to three feet away while,
"[a]ppelant, however, ... made no showing that contrary expert opinion exists." Id. One
further reason no showing could be made was the denial of expert assistance at habeas. See
infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
23. Id., at *6.
24. 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that if sanity is to be an issue at trial, the State is
constitutionally required to assure that the defendant has access to a competent psychiatrist).
25. 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (implying that due process may require that a defendant have
access to more than just psychiatric experts).
26. 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
1999]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
the right to "a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation and presentation of the
defense."27 In Caldwell, the Court expanded on the language of Ake and
implied that due process may require that a defendant have access to experts
other than psychiatric experts.28 In Husske, the Supreme Court of Virginia
read Ake and Caldwell together to mean that a defendant is entitled to non-
psychiatric expert witnesses if he can show that assistance of such an expert
is likely to be a significant factor in his defense and that he will be preju-
diced by a lack of expert assistance. 29 This decision gives counsel the oppor-
tunity to ask for more than just psychiatric experts. However, the showing
needed to get a court to actually appoint an expert under this line of cases
is a difficult one. In short, the courts have required that the requested expert
be critical to the defendant's case. Nevertheless, courts across the country
have appointed experts from many fields under the authority of Ake.3"
In this case, a very good argument could have been made that a firearms
or ballistics expert was critical to the defendant s case. As seen above,
counsel failed to refute the testimony of Julian Mason, the Commonwealth's
ballistics expert. Chichester could have requested a firearms or ballistics expert
of his own to refute the Commonwealth's testimony. Such an expert could
have been critical to Chichester's case because if the gun he owned was not the
gun used in the murder, a very reasonable doubt could have been raised in the
minds of the jurors. Although Chichester presented lay testimony on this
point, an expert became even more critical to Chichester's case when the
Commonwealth presented Mason, an expert, to refute the lay testimony.
Ake appointments are not easy to obtain. Nevertheless, Ake is underused
in Virginia. Trial counsel are invited to contact the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse for assistance in identifying experts and in crafting the necessary
showing for the trial court.
Jason J. Solomon
27. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (emphasis added).
28. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985).
29. Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925-927 (Va. 1996).
30. See, e.g., State v. Eastlack, 883 P.2d 999 (Ariz. 1994) (Conviction and sentence
reversed because of failure to have psychological assistance appointed); Rey v. State, 897
S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (defendant entitled to pathologist to evaluate, pursue, and
present evidence regarding cause of death); Dingle v. State, 654 So. 2d 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (failure to appoint a pediatric expert was reversible error); People v. Lawson, 644
N.E.2d 1172 (III. 1994) (a defense fingerprint/shoeprint expert was necessary to refute state's
expert); Bright v. State, 455 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 1995) (funds for a toxicologist were reasonably
necessary to defense); Ex Parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114 (Ala. 1996)(capital defendant entitled
to a competent expert in the field of expertise that has been found necessary to his defense);
State v. Coffey, 389 S.E.2d 48 (N.C. 1990) (trial court granted funds for expert in hair and
fiber analysis).
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